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Whose Development? Theories 




Developing countries face many different definitions of success from 
international financial organizations, the United Nations, and citi=ens' 
groups both domestic and foreign . How do constituencies in developing 
countries decide what steps to take? How do they define their own de-
velopment? I consider modernization theory, dependency theory, and 
theories of world systems and globalization, and find that none offer an 
adequate understanding of the agency of stakeholders . I argue that 
theorists should seek a greater understanding of the agency of political 
actors in choosing development paths, and of the domestic and interna-
tional discursive environments which form the context for their deci-
sions. 
Developing societies participate in multiple political dis-courses, each of which constructs development different-ly. For example, the IMF assesses economic adjustment 
policies. The UN Millennium Development Goals focus on in-
creasing the range of "choices" available to individuals, as indi-
cated by their health, literacy, and life expectancy (UNDP). Yet 
another set of priorities is suggested by the "alternative devel-
opment" movement, with its emphasis on "grass roots move-
ments, local lmowledge, and popular power (Escobar 215). 
Developing countries cannot, with their limited resources, realis-
tically pursue all of these objectives at once. Stakeholders must 
identify their most urgent priorities and situate them with respect 
to international and domestice practices and expectations. How 
do they do this? I argue that extant theories of development do 
not place enough emphasis on the agency of stakeholders in 
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choosing development paths.Theorists of development should 
seek an un-derstanding of the agency of political actors, and of 
the domestic and international discursive environments that form 
the context for their decisions. 
Modernization and development remain ill-defined concepts 
that lie behind increasingly expensive state and international 
programs . The literature on development reflects the attempts by 
scholars to define these terms, both theoretically and empirically, 
and to determine the effects of development programs on politi-
cal entities such as the state and civil society, and processes such 
as democratization. Development has been studied variously as 
"modernization" and "dependency" (though it might entail both 
of these and more); and it has been theorized as a conjoined 
process with democratic transition, as its antecedent, and as its 
product. In what follows, I sketch out the parameters of current 
development research, and summarize how it relates to my 
study. 
Modernization theory represents the first attempt to investi-
gate the peculiar situation of Third World states, the "new states" 
that appeared on the international scene as a result of World War 
II and decolonization. The extreme Eurocentrism of core moder-
nization theory has been criticized, and alternatives have been 
proposed for the underlying dichotomy of "underdeveloped" vs. 
"advanced," but many of the assumptions of modernization 
theory have remained a part of successive theories of develop-
ment. While its original form has been revised and replaced by 
more sophisticated approaches, modernization theory is signifi-
cant both in its role as the first unified effort by Western scholars 
to understand sociopolitical change in "poor" nations, and for 
codifying what the West understood to be "modernization." 
Deutsch (1961) sought to make the abstract concept of "devel-
opment" more concrete through measures of social mobilization. 
For Deutsch, development is characterized by a certain pattern of 
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social mobilization whereby people may move to cities and set 
up new communication networks and lifestyle patterns asso-
ciated with industrial nations. His definition of development, 
though only partial, set the stage for much of the development 
research of the 1960's through the 1980's. 
Theorists who use the concept of modernization in its broad 
sense are focused on linking modernization with democracy and 
stability. For Lipset (1959, 1994) and others, developing socie-
ties could achieve democracy and stability by replicating the rap-
id industrialization and export-led growth of the modernized 
West. This formulation changed in minor ways over time (Lipset 
et al.1993, Lipset 1994), but continued to be accepted as the log-
ical way for poor societies to attain the fruits of modernity . 
Moreover, while some theorists question the early moderniza-
tionists ' endorsement of Westernization policies (Bendix 1967) 
or its categorical rejection of all things "traditional" (Rudolph 
and Rudolph 1967) and some even assert the possibility of a 
negative correlation between some types of modernization and 
stability (Huntington 1965), they share a sense of confidence that 
modernization is a useful concept denoting a desirable outcome. 
Modernization theory is fundamentally flawed in its dogmat-
ic endorsement of Western forms as the endpoint of develop-
ment, obscuring the range of possible or desirable outcomes. The 
implicit narrative of modernization theory assures a single evolu-
tionary path shared by all societies, and on which all societies 
can be accurately placed . While this stance renders the theory 
parsimonious (political models often being judged primarily on 
that quality, as Blaney et al. 2002 illustrate), supporting evidence 
for it is lacking and modernization theorists do not sufficiently 
engage the counterevidence. Why do developing states manifest 
so many political and social phenomena that contrast sharply 
with those associated with the transition to modem statehood in 
the West, and why do some states seem to go "backward" on the 
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alleged evolutionary path? Moreover, how are some states able 
to develop without emulating important features of the Western 
model? To claim that divergent outcomes represent failures of 
modernization rather than problems with the theory is to prec-
lude the kinds of challenges and new evidence that should move 
a theory forward. 
The second failure of the theory is also structural. Essentially 
presuming a one-way trajectory of evolution that occurs "natu-
rally," the theory fails to systematically articulate the actors or 
agents of modernization. The range and impact of human action 
is left unclear, and the assumption that all societies should mod-
ernize casts opponents of modernization as short-sighted , igno-
rant, or even maleficent. At best, groups or individuals are 
depicted as conducive to modernization or against it, but no enti-
ty can start, stop, or entirely reshape the process due to its inevit-
able nature. Because modernization theory espouses a view of 
modernization as an evolutionary mandate without alternatives, 
the useful questions of why, when, and how modernization hap-
pens are not within its purview. 
The above objections to modernization theory culminated in 
the rise of dependency theory and world systems theory. Depen-
dency theory grew out of the work of Third World and First 
World economists and political scientists who analyzed the ma-
cro-economic basis for chronic poverty in the developing world. 
The hypothesis, developed by two economists, Raul Prebisch 
and Hans Singer, continues to have implications for all studies in 
development: since the terms of trade tend not to favor agricul-
tural products, developing regions will continue to be at a disad-
vantage in a situation of "free" international trade. However, 
while this seed-theory had promise for generating much-needed 
study of development and wealth discrepancies on an interna-
tional scale, its usefulness was hampered by political controversy 
and it was never allowed to grow into a sufficiently nuanced 
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theory. Just as scholars such as Andre Gunder Frank (1975, 
1979) adapted the Singer-Prebisch hypothesis to fit Marxist 
theory, the Cold War was taking its toll in the scholarly commu-
nity and Marxist work was effectively being "contained" in the 
Second and Third Worlds. So, while many useful pieces such as 
Valanzuela and Valanzuela (1978), Cardozo and Faleto (1979), 
and Przeworski and Lirnongi (1997) demonstrate the merits of 
dependency theory for understanding certain cases, the theory 
has not been subject to rigorous theoretical challenges and em-
pirical testing. As a result, dependency theory remains too spe-
cifically formulated to Latin America to be useful for other 
cases, and lacks salience in the context of "globalized" economic 
relationships where companies "outsource" production of manu-
factured goods to developing countries (Sarkar, 1986). 
While the exact relationship between dependency and world 
systems theory is debatable, they derive their ideas from similar 
observations: that unequal economic interactions entrench persis-
tent inequalities among international actors, and that, without 
counter-measures of significant scale, the trend will continue to 
the detriment of developing societies. Immanuel Wallerstein ar-
ticulated the concept of the macro-structural "core," those states 
with significant bargaining power in the international scene; vs. 
the "periphery," or those states with less bargaining power, and 
therefore less chance to progress and develop according to their 
own economic priorities . The concept has spawned much study 
in international relations and comparative politics, and has prov-
en its salience as a possible way of structuring an understanding 
of development discrepancies. However, w_orld systems theory 
offers only a hyPothetical macro-structure, and is of limited use-
fulness in understanding how and why development happens. 
Both dependency and world systems theories improved our 
understanding of development by reframing development as a 
variable process, human-created, and fallible; and by demon-
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strating that development policies take shape according to the 
agendas of internal and external political actors. However, while 
theorists draw our attention to the impact of foreign powers on 
developing states, they tend not to recognize the agency of de-
veloping states themselves in adopting and shaping their own 
policies. Poorer states are seen as perpetually "between a rock 
and a hard place," forced to accept unfavorable terms in their 
relationship with rich states for fear of stronger coercion or sanc-
tions. However, dependency theorists forget the element that 
distinguishes post-colonialism from colonialism: interdepen-
dence that is fluid and market-led. In a post-colonial world, de-
veloping states often do have a hand in determining their role 
with powerful neighbors even if their choices are restricted, and 
developing states' bids for economic investment may make out-
right coercion unnecessary. Developing states do make choices 
in navigating their roles with former patron states, international 
entities, and the "developed" world as a whole. Debt and poverty 
weigh heavily on developing states, but they can and do find dif-
ferent ways of responding to their situation. 
In the discussion of competing notions of development, di-
chotomies of "rival" worldviews often serve to eclipse important 
similarities among theories. It is relevant to note where depen-
dency theory followed in the footsteps of modernization theory 
( or at least implicitly accepts some of its edicts), and where this 
study diverges from their trajectory. Modernization theory as-
sumes that development is a single, universal, one-way process 
that all states will face, or will ideally face, at some time. De-
pendency theory assumes that actors are driven to take steps to-
ward development in response to contextual factors. However, 
both are unclear about who must be the agents of change. Mod-
ernization posits a "natural" and universal process that should 
prevail in every society eventually; while dependency theorists 
emphasize the exploitative nature of the relations between weal-
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thy and poor countries, belittling the role of developing states 
themselves in initiating changes. These two approaches are 
wrong in conceptualizing development as a given or organic 
process. Theories of globalization come closer to a complex and 
problematized view of development as a set of possible changes 
that can be brought about by developing states and societies 
themselves, powerful external entities with which they must inte-
ract for their survival, and the international community as a 
whole. However, as globalization theories emphasize the revolu-
tionary "interconnectedness" of the current era, they risk losing 
the broad concept of "modernization" as a cultural, economic, 
and political process rooted in a region 's specific history. 
Globalization theory offers the most coherent critique of 
mainstream approaches to development: that they presume a 
"str ict separation between internal and external affairs, the do-
mestic and international arenas, and the local and the global." 
(Held and McGrew, 2002) The current interaction of states, cor-
porations, and international organizations attests to the pern1ea-
bility of these categories. The globalization school spawns new 
concepts that more accurately reflect the dynamics of global pol-
itics and help scholars analyze political power. The most signifi-
cant contributions of globalization theory engage and energize 
the debates about the changing nature, scope, and significance of 
globalization, and must be understood in the context of these 
debates. 
As questions about development and underdevelopment in-
tensify, the battle lines in globalization theory are being drawn 
and redrawn. For some, the primary challenge posed by globali-
zation is the need for new conceptions of governance, with new 
institutionalism and constructivism offering competing views 
(Hart 2000a). For others, an exclusive focus on state action no 
longer makes sense at all, as we are faced with unprecedented 
integration of social relations of all kinds (Giddens 2002). As is 
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common in times of accelerated change, there is a shift toward a 
more normative, "big-picture" debate about whether globaliza-
tion is a force for good or evil. One fact is clear: though views of 
the globalizing world are many, assessments of globalization 
tend to fall into two broad categories, according to whether they 
highlight the beneficial or detrimental aspects of interconnected-
ness. On the one hand, economic neoliberals herald globalization 
as the path to prosperity and development, the tide that raises all 
boats. Ohmae (19990, 1995) and Perlmutter (1991) see globali-
zation as bringing great benefits, including the East Asian mi-
racle, the "information superhighway," and ever-increasing 
trade. Howard (1981), Mueller (1989) and Russett (1993) even 
extend the premise of interconnectedness to predict a permanent 
state of peace and cooperation between states. 
But , there is also a growing movement of opponents of glo-
balization who emphasize the connection between globalization 
and inequal1ty, in both the cultural and economic realms (e.g. 
Castells 1997, Greider 1997, and UNDP 1999). The data, culled 
from comrnwuties from the neighborhood level to the interna-
tional level, is unsurprisingly contradictory and ambiguous. Glo-
balization is often associated with a loss of cultural identity, but 
there is also evidence that the "global village" provides new 
~ays to activate cultural identities. Globalization challenges tra-
ditional forms of belonging, brings people together in new asso-
ciations, and makes spaces and opportunities for new identities 
to be formed (Held, 237). 
The concept of globalization offers particular promise, but 
also poses a particular problem for the theorist of development. 
As of now, economic globalization is the most accurate term for 
the set of changes in the international economic environment that 
are inordinately affecting developing societies: increased mobili-
ty of capital; a widening "digital gap" between regions with a 
thriving IT sector and those without; the international regulation 
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of agricultural production via patented seeds; and the privatiza-
tion of natural resources by transnational companies. However, 
while proponents of the globalization approach do recognize the 
significance of wealth discrepancies among states, they do not 
adequately theorize the distinction between economically power-
ful "advanced industrial democratic" states and the developing 
world. Prominent theorists of cultural globalization, whether 
they recognize a loss of culture or a cultural gain, tend to assume 
that most communities are "up to date" in the globalized world, 
already competing in the "rat race," for better or worse. On the 
contrary, many communities in the developing world face a lack 
of such advantages as infrastructure and infonnation technology, 
i.e. they are not yet integrated or "globalized" to the same degree 
or in the same way as are their counterparts in the developed 
world. These communities provide counterevidence to the asser-
tion that we are all increasingly interconnected. 
Advocates of economic globalization often use the "business 
model" to understand the dilemma of all states, blurring differ-
ences in resources and opportunities. An instructive example of 
the limits of the business model is Simon Anholt's Brand New 
Justice (2003). Anholt advocates name branding as a business 
strategy that would allow developing societies to alleviate their 
poverty. Unfortunately, name branding may not always be an 
available strategy to the poorest of developing societies, who are 
often stuck in unfavorable trade relationships that limit their ex-
port options to raw materials, piecemeal manufactured goods, 
and labor. Name branding is predicated on the perceived "com-
parative advantage" enjoyed by some regions and states in par-
ticular industries, and requires considerable startup capital to 
become viable in exports. Developing countries often have less 
stable availability of capital, and they are also less likely to be 
perceived as having "comparative advantage" given the fact that 
they are consistently portrayed as having little more than raw 
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materials and human populations in surplus quantities. So, while 
name branding may be an option in India or Brazil, for example, 
it may be less possible in very poor countries where comparative 
advantage is elusive. The business model manifests other theo-
retical flaws, as well: many entities in the globalized world, such 
as media conglomerates and monopolies, are "fundamentally 
non-competitive in any meaningful economic sense of the term." 
(McChesney , 2002) Conversely, smaller entities and enterprises 
may not be able to meaningfully "compete" with the political 
forces that dominate them, as in the case of agricultural produc-
ers in Western Africa versus those in more heavily subsidized 
regions of the world . Globalized markets are not necessarily free 
markets. Therefore , thinking of states as businesses in a free 
market is not conducive to understanding the different kinds of 
constraints they face in the international arena. 
What is globalized "development," and what is the status of 
developing societies in an age of globalization? Developing so-
cieties typically experience less economic diversification and 
less access to free-flowing communication and information; they 
are more drastically affected by changes in modes of agricultural 
production and are more prone to the resource interests of trans-
national entities; and they typically have less state capacity 
coupled with a greater need for trade and other forms of econom-
ic interconnectedness , restricting their ability to use policies and 
laws to control the degree to which they are affected by globali-
zation . The emphasis on increasing mobility and access is not 
conducive to analyzing cases where resources become more cen-
tralized within and among countries. Globalization theory cannot 
cope with contexts where mobility and access actually decrease . 
My primary critique of the above theories is that they are 
each built around a restricted definition of what development is 
and where it comes from. Where theories seem to have incom-
patible perspectives , they can actually complement each other to 
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collectively produce a more valid understanding of the political 
processes affecting the developing world. However, there is little 
possibility for adapting the theories to new phenomena because 
their narrowed definitions of development are dogmatic. Depen-
dency theory assumes a "comparative advantage" trade situation 
with a strict separation between agricultural and manufacturing 
producers. Economic globalization theory cannot effectively 
analyze the effects of urbanization on commerce in the country-
side, because it is predicated on a definition of globalization as 
increasing access to information. Such theories risk a Procrus-
tean analytical error when new data do not fit their rigidified 
evaluations of development. 
The scholarly challenge to responsibly theorize the multifa-
riously defined realm of development is compounded by the 
relative ease by which development institutions adapt to the rhe-
toric of contestation. United Nations programs have nearly com-
pleted the switch to more politically acceptible woman-centered 
and poor-centered language with remarkable ease, as Arturo Es-
cobar forewarned years ago (Escobar,1995). Feminists, in partic-
ular, have responded warily to this shift from openly urban and 
extractive initiatives to "rural development" and "poverty reduc-
tion" programs. The physicist and social movement leader Van-
dana Shiva repeatedly points to the countervailing interests of 
international financial organizations and rural communities, and 
calls for rural women to speak out against top-down policies, 
however "participatory" they claim to be (Shiva, 2005). Similar-
ly, Shahra Razavi sees the new framing as nothing more than a 
new marketing sheen for development, ironically warning of its 
risks for women and feminist movements worldwide in a book 
published by the United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development. 
Many individual scholars in a variety of fields are recogniz-
ing the need for a more inclusive, data-led theory that would re-
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fleet the varied and changing nature of development. These 
theorists have had considerable success in promoting a wider 
purview with regard to development, and are able to analyze 
moments when development strategies seem to be distinct from 
other kinds of political action employed by developing states. I 
will consider a representative few of the approaches below, with 
particular attention to how they might illuminate area studies of 
Mongolia and other developing societies. 
James C. Scott ' s Seeing Like a State examines large scale 
development programs that have gone awry in their mission to 
fundamentally "improve" the social or cultural basis of certain 
societies. He finds a pattern to· such programs, not in the me-
chanisms that produce negative consequences-some are acci-
dental, some deliberate, and some despite assiduous efforts to 
"make it work" in the face of widespread popular resistance-
but in the motivations and ideologies that legitimate the com-
plete reordering of society. Scott' s decision to look at the most 
disastrous campaigns lends clarity to our way of assessing de-
velopment. By focusing on the outcomes that we already agree 
should be avoided (such as famine in Ukraine under Stalin or the 
massive death tolls under Mao during the Great Leap Forward) , 
Scott avoids the arbitrary labeling of development as "bad" or 
"good" and is able to examine the significant cultural change that 
makes development campaigns different from smaller scale po-
litical processes. 
However, while Seeing Like a State illuminates moderniza-
tion in mahy ways, it does not yield insight on the experiences of 
developing states in particular. By lumping early industrializa-
tion programs in Soviet Russia and China together with colonial 
and post-colonial events in the Third World, Scott obfuscates 
theoretically important differences. The factors that provoked 
industrialization of societies that became major world powers are 
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not identical to those that continue to influence societies in the 
developing world 
One important characteristic of development as experienced 
by "poor" societies is the constant assurance that it is an ex-
pected, natural, and necessary process. Consequences, side ef-
fects and sacrifices are normalized. In "The Myths of the Market 
and the Common History of Late Developers," (1993) Kiren 
Aziz Chaudhry notes the "strong evolutionary undertones" of the 
discourse regarding market transitions, as evidenced by the per-
sistent emphasis on "the pivotal role of the demonstration effect, 
economic stagnation, the emergence of a 'competent bourgeoi-
sie,' and ' learning."' (248) Choudhry questions the assumption 
that markets are part of a natural evolutionary process. 
Markets are conscious constructs- in the same vein that 
command economies are deliberate arrangements- in that 
they are based , by design or default , on political principles 
(who gets what, why, and how) and on choices of how indi-
vidual resources , rights , aspirations , and possibilities are re-
conciled with collective ones. The assumption that markets 
are "neutral " and "natural " obscures the politic al choices 
that are embedded in the institutions that govern the market. 
(247) . 
Choudhry ' s observations can be generalized to apply to 
many other aspects of development, as well. If we replace the 
word "market" with "development," the passage holds true: 
many deliberate and highly specific political arrangements may 
be folded into the development process . These arrangements de-
serve special examination and possible reevaluation, as they 
bring weighty consequences for the populations of developing 
countries and the globalized world as a whole. 
Moreover, it is misleading to speak of one market that all 
may adopt, or of one trajectory of development that all may 
achieve. Concepts of "the market," "development ," and even 
"democracy" cannot be transferred in toto from the advanced 
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industrial West to the developing world, and interpretations of 
them may differ from region to region. Frederic C. Schaffer, in 
his book Democracy in Translation examines two separate no-
tions of democracy: one denoted by the French word democratie, 
and one by the Wolof hybrid word demokaraasi. Both are used 
regularly in political discourse in Senegal, but have entirely dif-
ferent meanings. In his primarily linguistic study, Schaffer un-
covers a split between perceptions of a political system that 
should rest on old sources of legitimacy such as religion, and one 
resting on new affiliations such as national citizenship. 
Schaffer's study reveals important dynamics of development 
in that differently situated political actors may perceive different 
needs and manifest accordingly diverse policy preferences and 
theoretical understandings with regard to basic concepts. No-
where is this truer than in the developing world, where demo-
cratic deliberation may be undermined by actors with strong 
economic interests and powerful bargaining positions. However, 
the awareness that different interpretations of basic political con-
cepts exist is only the first step to understanding them. Unfortu-
nately, Schaffer does not discuss the origin and significance of 
competing notions of democracy, which diminishes the political 
relevance of his study. Without a discussion of the political dy-
namics that produce diverging perceptions, he risks echoing the 
simplistic default explanation endemic to development dis-
course: that some peoples are inherently more capable of modem 
democracy than others. Daniel Lerner (1958) correlated willing-
ness to modernize with the net effect of individual and group 
characteristics and social affiliation, while Almond and Verba 
(1963) have emphasized a society's history as the decisive fac-
tor; but, regardless of the specific variables considered, these 
explanations rely on a primordial understanding of national cha-
racter . Attributing political change to non-political sources per-
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petuates ethnocentric superiority claims and belittles the validity 
of developing societies' own political preferences and struggles. 
It is possible to examine the interplay of cultural and politi-
cal factors without propagating simplistic notions of causation. 
In Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia, Uradyn E. Bulag 
considers the social dimension of political change in Mongolia 
during and after socialism. He finds that moments of greatest 
political flux are also times of relentless social restructuring. In 
this sense, large scale political campaigns are times of great pos-
sibility for creating, disabling, and activating ethnic and gender 
identities, and for repositioning them in ways that further the 
goals of the state. The Soviet-influenced regime in Mongolia 
increased the politicization of ethnic labels and analogized ethnic 
conflict with class struggle, so that "once the redistributive sys-
tem was removed, we see revealed an exclusive type of ethnicity, 
based on territory, economic specialization, and local power, 
which it in effect created" (Bulag 259). While it might be legiti-
mately claimed that regimes do not "create" ethnicity, but only 
instrumentalize and magnify existing ethnic divisions, Bulag's 
overall point holds. Even after a successful political campaign is 
completed or replaced with a new one, a legacy may remain in 
the form of highly politicized social, ethnic, and gender hierar-
chies. The ideological worldview may nqt survive, but social 
messages and connotations are much more enduring. In newly 
democratic Mongolia, debates over the ethnic supremacy of the 
majority Khalkha is at issue in rival parties' competing depic-
tions of"development" and "democracy." 
Further, Bulag demonstrates how social restructuring aimed 
at achieving modern status is often justified with the necessity of 
complying with new standards of appropriateness and respecta-
bility as a society. Gender identities and sexual reproduction are 
often the prime locus of change in a developing society, and po-
litical discourse reflects the state's interest in fostering such 
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change. He cites Heng and Devan (1992), who documented the 
Singaporian government 's campaign to encourage well-to-do 
Chlnese women to have more chlldren "to counteract the ' irres-
ponsible' hlgh birth rate of the lower-class Malay and Indian 
women. The prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, openly attacked 
educated Chinese women for not producing the 'genetically su-
perior' chlldren necessary for the prosperity of the Singaporian 
nation" (Bulag 261). Thls passage shows that ethnic and gender 
identities, far from being outside the political realm, are highly 
relevant for the developing state. To be modem, a state must ac-
quire the necessary social profile, and those in power become the 
"keepers" of a society's modern status. (For more analysis of 
Mongolia as a developing society, see section 3.1) 
There is a constant flow of empirical research on certain in-
tractable patterns in regional development efforts, and similar 
insight is needed with regard to broader problems in develop-
ment. An excellent example of empirical research on a regional 
development problem is Nicolas van de Walle's African Econo-
mies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999. Analyzing 
perceived "failures" in African aid projects, van de Walle finds 
that corruption and clientelism doom many aid projects, and that 
more attention should be paid ''to the state and to the interests, 
economic ideas, and capacity to be found within the state appara-
tus" (280). While he is primarily interested in African cases, van 
de Walle's approach of highlighting broad patterns that persist 
across time holds potential for research on broader questions in 
the development world. 
Likewise, broader critiques often lack the empirical basis to 
usefully engage with the majority of work in the field of devel-
opment. Arturo Escobar's Encountering Development: The Mak-
ing and Unmaking of the Third World (1995) demonstrates how 
the historically constructed notion of cumulative and inevitable 
development is not simply a relic of modernization theory--on 
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the contrary, it is a cornerstone of contemporary development 
discourse. Accepting such a notion of development as anything 
but a historical construct marginalizes the experiences and needs 
those who must be "developed." But, while mainstream theories 
of development are definitely problematic in a normative sense, 
empirical evidence is needed to show more specifically where 
they fail to describe the world. 
How do you theorize agency in a development context, 
where there is no clear consensus on the means and ends of de-
velopment? Firstly, a strong theory of development must em-
phasize that stakeholders have choices to make about how they 
will construct development. Secondly, their choices are con-
strained by domestic and international environments that already 
define development in various ways, and these may be asso-
ciated with particular constraints and incentives for political ac-
tors. For example, political actors in a society may be compelled 
to support particular policies to increase trade, to attract invest-
ment, or for any number of other economic and political goals. 
More specific illustrations of incentives include broad-based in-
ternational investment for countries who pledge to achieve the 
UN Millenium Development Goals, or a share of the $1 billion 
Millennium Challenge Account offered by the United States to 
reward free trade policies in low-income countries. In the midst 
of these nonns and prescriptions, individual stakeholders re-
spond by shaping the discourse in whatever way they can or pri-
vileging a given discourse in the turbulent environment of civil 
society. In tllis way, individuals make constrained choices about 
how to construct development in the domestic and international 
spheres. 
Individual stakeholders have choices to make about how to 
bring about policies that they themselves favor, but also about 
how to foster the relationships that will help them shape devel-
opment in a given sphere. Strategic positioning with other politi-
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cal actors is the main path to development, however it is con-
strued. Development, as an outcome of collective political ac-
tion, is contingent on forming relationships, mobilizing people, 
and altering society. This essential interconnectedness may be 
sought in different forrns--economic investment, social net-
works, access to information-but increased participation and 
clout in discourse is usually the means, if not the end. States may 
face many obstacles to integrating themselves in the world mar-
ket, and poor states may have particular difficulty in attracting 
trade and investment. However, trade and investment, along with 
other forms of interconnectedness, are crucial elements of devel-
opment that provide the economic basis for other policies a state 
may wish to pursue. Strategically chosen economic ties make 
development possible for poor states. Therefore, we can say that 
poor states who embrace a development program will consistent-
ly try to attract trade, investment, and other forms of intercon-
nectedness with influential external actors. 
Gaining favorable relationships is an enduring purpose for 
P.OOr states, and one that may occasionally take priority over oth-
er policy objectives that are also part of the development pro-
gram. To be associated with development, individual policies do 
not necessarily have any clear and visible connection with a spe-
cific domestic or international goal such as increasing economic 
activity, or engendering political freedom. Rather, many devel-
opment policies are undertaken specifically to increase compati-
bility with powerful external political actors in order to foster 
interconnectedness. 
Even multilateral recognition of the need to re-think deve-
lopmentalist rhetoric has not yet culminated in robust scholarly 
critique.Self-proclaimed labels are all over the map, with critics 
worldwide positioning themselves in a bewildering variety of 
ways as proponents of "sustainable development," "alternative 
development," "anti-development," "post-development." Should 
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the term "development" only be used in an ironic sense to high-
light the historical discrepancy between the development project 
and the real needs of those it targets; or is it better to bracket this 
discrepancy and get to work on a new vision of development 
based on human needs? Labels tend to introduce more confusion 
than they resolve, and no sort of prefix can substitute for critical 
investigation of the countervailing interests at play in defining 
the term "development." One conclusion is sure: Scholars who 
invoke the term "development" uncritically lack relevance to its 
varied constituencies and their changing experiences, impove-
rishing the field of "development." 
Empirical data is needed in order to construct more informed 
theories of development that do justice to the agency and inter-
play of political actors. Understanding agency is essential to the 
ongoing scholarly project of theorizing development, and will 
ultimately have implications for globalization theory, rational 
choice, and the emerging theories of sustainable development. 
Visions of how societies might prosper in the globalizing world 
are more meaningful when there is real knowledge of how de-
velopment is created and defined by those who influence and 
experience it directly. 
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